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Benedict Anderson defined nations as "imagined communities," im ­plying that there are communities that are not imagined but based 
on some kind of "hard" essential reality such as family, clan, tribe, 
and so forth.1 O n closer reflection, however, it becomes clear that all 
communities or, to be more precise, all collective identities are imagined. 
I t is not "blood" or "descent" as such that keeps a group together but the 
shared consciousness of it, the idea of common descent. T h e same applies 
even to personal identity. Even the self­image of a person may be seen as 
an imagined entity. Identity, on all its levels, from the individual person 
to large groups such as nations and religious communities, is a product of 
imagination and of mental representation. 
T h e constitutive role of memory in this process of self­image mak­
ing or identity formation was identified by the sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs in the 1920s2 and is constantly confirmed and expanded by 
modern psychology, psychotherapy, and brain research.3 "We are what we 
remember."4 In the context of this discourse, memory is usually under­
stood as a function of the human brain and as a matter of brain cells and 
their connections. Halbwachs decisively expanded this narrow notion of 
memory by showing its social dimension. Individual memory is a social 
fact; it develops by socialization and communication. T h e same applies, as 
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George Herbert Mead has shown, to personal identity, to the category of 
selfhood that is formed by processes of mirroring or triangulation in rela­
tion to "significant others."5 Thus, the slogan "we are what we remember" 
must be complemented by the phrase "we are what we belong to," since 
remembering and belonging are so closely interconnected. In this respect, 
a person may be defined as the juncture of two dimensions: the social 
dimension and the dimension of time. Our memory enables us to orient 
ourselves in both the temporal and the social dimension, to "belong" in 
the broadest sense, to form relations with others. Memory as a means of 
orientation has to be understood as a faculty of remembering and of for­
getting. Those who remember everything are unable to orient themselves 
in time and society in the same way as those who notice everything are 
unable to orient themselves in space. Orientation requires selection. T h e 
function of memory is orientation, not the storage and reproduction of 
true and objective representations of the past. 
For Halbwachs, the cement that keeps groups together, the principle 
of connectivity, from family to nation to religious communities, is emo­
tion. H e defined groups as communautes affectives. Emotion is certainly an 
important factor in the formation of collective self­images or imagination 
in the sense of Benedict Anderson. W h a t seems much more important in 
this context and is being constantly undervalued, however, is the role of 
symbolization, of "symbolic forms" in the sense of Ernst Cassirer, whose 
work on the philosophy of symbolic forms6 appeared simultaneously with 
Maurice Halbwachs's work on the social frames of memory. T h e human 
being as the animal sociale, the "zoon politikon" of Aristotle, is not so much 
the emotional but the symbol­using animal. 
T h e notion of symbol forces us to transcend the frames of body 
and consciousness and to take into account the whole range of cultural 
expression, of texts, images, and actions, as carriers or representations of 
memory and identity expressive of time, selfhood, and belonging. It is 
not adequate to restrict the notion of memory to the individual psyche, 
as the psychologists do, or to the sphere of communication in the wake of 
Maurice Halbwachs and the social psychologists. M y concern is to open 
up the sphere of culture—or at least a core domain comprising religion, 
art, history, and morality—to research into memory and to investigate 
what we call "cultural memory" in its forms and functions. In the fol­
lowing brief survey, I explain the memory function of cultural objects, 
which I divide into material objects, actions, and texts—or deiknymena, 
dromena, and legomena, to use the terminology of the ancient mystery 
cults. 
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Material Objects 
In the sphere of material objects, the memory function becomes manifest 
in a will to form or formative intention, which informs the productions 
of human activity so as to make them share a set of distinctive features or 
acquire a kind of family resemblance. The formal repertoire of tools, weap­
ons, pottery, pictures, and buildings—in fact, all kinds of artifacts that, as 
traces of human existence, reach back over many millennia—is informed 
by a strict regularity that renders it accessible to morphological analysis, in 
the same way as the forms of nature. This regularity makes it possible to 
identify a singular object in terms of date, provenance, and function.7 
The will to form leads to the formation of traditions and ensures cul­
tural continuity and identity.8 In this respect, we may speak of a memory-
function of culture, even of material culture. This morphological tradition or 
memory is the basis of prehistory and archaeology and all other disciplines 
of cultural studies dealing with human artifacts. Art history, musicology, 
philology, literary studies, and so on reflect in their methodology the mor­
phological features of cultural products that are expressive of the memory 
function of culture. There is a will to form that is a will of transmission, 
of transmitting a distinctive cultural identity to further generations. In 
its earliest stages, it must not necessarily have had a conscious purpose, 
and the formation of tradition among the first tribes of human beings was 
probably not very different from nature's ways of stabilizing traditions. 
Animals do things, such as building their homes, in forms that show a 
much more striking family resemblance, in fact, a complete identity. Seen 
this way, the principle of human ways of forming traditions seems to be 
variation rather than identity, in contrast to the animal world, where we 
see identical repetition and replication. 
The principle of variation becomes more and more important with 
the advance of cultural evolution. We must not forget, however, that in 
the human world, family resemblance or distinctive features in artifacts 
do not stem from a natural, that is, instinctive disposition but from free 
choice among alternative solutions. Free choice requires orientation, and 
orientation is provided not by instinct, that is, biological memory, but by 
cultural memory. Thus we may say that, going back to a very early stage 
of the production of artifacts, a distinction between a functional, or pri­
mary, aspect and a symbolical, or secondary, aspect is possible, the primary 
being its function as a tool, the secondary consisting in its belonging to a 
tradition of tool making. An arrowhead, for example, shows in its primary 
aspect its function with regard to which it has been shaped by its maker, 
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and it shows in its secondary aspect its stylistically distinctive features that 
tell us something about its date and provenance, its belonging to what 
prehistorians call a "specific culture." From its functionally distinctive fea­
tures we learn that it is an arrowhead (and not a macehead), and from its 
stylistically distinctive features we learn that it belongs to a certain North 
American tribe of two thousand years ago. 
From a certain time onward—which is usually connected with the 
invention of agriculture and pottery, that is, the "Neolithic revolution"— 
the distinction between the primary and the secondary level of shaping 
becomes even more obvious by the introduction of a new principle of 
form giving, decoration, which belongs exclusively to the second level. A 
knife and a jar do not fulfill their function any better by being deco­
rated with ornaments or figures, but they gain immensely in morphologi­
cal features, or pregnancy, permitting their identification with regard to 
provenance, date, and cultural context. A t this stage, at the latest, we may 
confidently say that the distinction between the primary and the second­
ary was consciously made and practiced by the producers and users of 
cultural artifacts, for decorated artifacts do not carry these features just as 
symptoms that tell only the modern connoisseur about their contextual 
circumstances but display them as symbols conveying a certain message 
to the contemporary user and observer. These artifacts undergo a second­
ary formalization, enhancing not their functionality but their meaning, 
a meaning that aims at making visible certain elements of the semantic 
universe and the identity of the group. This is how the aesthetic makes its 
first appearance among the material productions of human culture. 
T h e function of decoration is not to be described as "disinterested 
pleasure" (interesseloses Wohlgefalien, Kant's definition of the aesthetic 
experience) but as a kind of memorization technique by which the seman­
tic universe is made not only visible but permanent and transmittable. 
Second­level formalization serves, within the sphere of objects of every­
day life, as a principle of connectivity, stabilizing and transmitting cultural 
knowledge and symbolizing norms, values, and myths that constitute col­
lective identity. In these early times, "before the era of art,"9 the aesthetic 
seems inseparably linked to the mnemonic. 
Action 
T h e will to form imprints itself not only in artifacts belonging to the 
entourage materiel but also in actions, particularly in actions that were 
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meant to be efficient beyond the moment of performance and thus to cre­
ate and support memory. In the sphere of actions, the distinction between 
a primary and a second level of formalization becomes inevitable. This is 
the distinction between routines and rites, or "routinization" and "ritual­
ization." In the case of routines, formalization is meant simply to relieve 
effort in the pursuit of a certain goal. This primary (functional) level of 
formalization already fulfills a mnemonic function. But there is also a 
possible secondary (symbolical) level of formalization in which the mne­
monic function is much more prominent. 
This secondary level of formalization may be called "ritualization." 
Rites are symbolic actions whose meaning exceeds the primary purpose of 
the action. T h e reaping of grain, for example, is an action that is usually 
heavily formalized in its technical performance without being, for this 
reason, a rite. Its only purpose is the fulfillment of an important step in 
the grain harvest. This is what we may call the "primary purpose," and the 
only function of routinization lies in paving the way to its easy achieve­
ment. In the ancient Egyptian festival of Min, on the other hand, the 
reaping of grain was celebrated with great solemnity in order to ensure not 
only the abundance of present and future harvesting but also the stability 
and legitimacy of the reign of the pharaoh as the guarantor of fertility and 
abundance. This goal exceeds by far the primary purpose of cutting grain. 
In this case, we are dealing not with a routine but with a rite. Routiniza­
tion is just formalization and nothing more; in the case of ritualization, 
however, formalization fulfills the additional function of semiotization, of 
charging the action with meaning. Rites are "symbolic actions" referring to 
and acting upon the "semantic universe" (Sinnwelt) of human existence. 
To give a more familiar example: eating and drinking are actions that 
on the primary level of routinization usually tend to undergo a certain for­
malization in family life. O n the second level of ritualization, the eating of 
bread and the drinking of wine in Jewish families is celebrated on the eve 
of Shabbat as a "mnemonic mark," or zikkaron, both of the seventh day of 
creation and of the exodus from Egypt (yitsi 'at mitsrayim). In Christian­
ity, the eating of bread and the drinking of wine is celebrated with great­
est solemnity as the sacrament of the Eucharist. This rite was explicitly 
instituted with the words "Do this in remembrance of me" as a zikkaron in 
order to commemorate the death of Christ and to provide participation 
in its redemptory significance.10 Even in cases in which the memory func­
tion is not made explicit, we are dealing with a form of memory. Every rite 
is a zikkaron, a commemorative symbol that refers either to a historical 
event, such as the exodus from Egypt and the crucifixion of Christ, or to 
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a mythical event such as the seventh day of creation or the institution of 
pharaonic kingship. 
Language 
If we turn from objects and actions to speech and language, the distinction 
between a primary and a secondary level of formalization appears in a new 
light. Language is the generation of sounds with the purpose of denoting 
and expressing meanings. Here the semiotic function is already operative 
on the level of primary functioning. Speech is in itself already symbolic 
action11 without, however, being ritual. Language, like any other kind of 
action and artifact, serves a certain function in everyday life—communi­
cation. This is its primary level, and the correspondent ways of primary 
formalization and routinization consist in the formation of traditions of 
articulation and formulation in everyday communication, in genres of 
speech or ways of saying things. In some cases, however, the second level 
of formalization becomes prominent, which has to do with the will of or 
need for transmission. In the sphere of language, the alliance between 
the aesthetic and the mnemonic becomes most obvious. If an utterance 
is designed to be preserved and to stay efficient beyond the moment of 
its pronunciation, that is, to serve the secondary purpose of becoming a 
mnemonic mark, it has to be submitted to a process of secondary formal­
ization. Only by acquiring certain additional distinctive features of form 
and genre is an utterance capable of staying in memory and remaining 
accessible to later recourse, repetition, elaboration, and commentary. A 
formalized utterance is a carrier of memory, a mnemonic mark in being 
both an element of tradition (which is in itself a form of memory) and 
memorable for future recourse. It employs memory and creates memory. 
Therefore, in speech and language, formalization acts as a means of 
stabilization. Its only purpose is to render meaning permanent. This is 
what Eric Havelock called "preserved communication." In my terminol­
ogy, formalization is what turns an utterance into a text. "Text," in everyday 
use, means "formalized utterance," formalized, that is, in view of being 
remembered, transmitted, and repeatedly taken up. Text is speech in the 
status of a mnemonic mark. With the category of text, language passes, in 
my terminology, from the level of communication to the level of memory. 
For this reason, the laws of morphology apply to language as well as 
to all of the other human artifacts. Also in the utterances designed for 
later use, which I propose to call "texts," there is manifest a will to form, 
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which attempts to stabilize the word beyond its moment of pronunciation. 
Rhyme, assonance, parallelism, alliteration, meter, rhythm, and melody 
are devices of stabilization meant to render permanent the volatile words 
in the flow of time; in the same way as with material artifacts, these fea­
tures render for the philologist a text definable in space and time in terms 
of style, genre, function, situational context, Sitz im Leben, and so forth. 
In the following, I show that writing is just another kind of second­
ary formalization. Writing was invented and applied, in the first place, to 
linguistic units unfit for the usual poetical means of formalization. Writ­
ing was first invented for recording and preserving the prosaic and con­
tingent data of economics and administration in the early states—that is, 
the data that could not possibly be memorized. No human memory and 
no memorization technique would be able to handle these data. Writing 
made it possible to turn lists of names, numbers, and objects into texts 
to preserve them for later reference and repetition without any further 
formalization. 
What Is a "Text"? 
Transmission and the "Extended Situation" 
What is a text? The word textus is derived from texo, "to weave"; it indi­
cates tissue, connection. Quintilian takes this metaphor to denote the 
connection of words, the structure and coherence of speech. There does 
not seem to exist any equivalent for this term in ancient languages outside 
Latin.12 Quintilian refers to the rhetorical notion of "text."The rhetorical 
tradition distinguishes between information and message, subject matter 
and the act of speaking. This distinction is constantly blurred in oriental 
languages. Egyptian mdt and Hebrew dabar denote both speech and what 
speech is about. Whoever refers to something that has been said or writ­
ten is unable to make clear whether he or she refers to the form or the 
content of speech. In the words of Werner Kelber, 
Writing is the technique of making words visible. This exteri­
orization of language tends to foster the impression of visible 
signs in separation from the actuality they refer to. In linguistic 
terms, writing forces the distinction between signs on surfaces, 
the signifiers, and the content with which they are being charged, 
the signified. It lies in the nature of written language that it can 
be abstracted from its signification. Spoken words are not visible 
1 
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apart from their signifiers. In the absence of exterior manifesta­
tions, oral discourse appears to be more intimately allied with the 
actuality to which it refers. When sounded words are thus known 
to be effective in the act of speaking, it takes but one small step to 
regard them "as being of the same order of reality as the matters 
and events to which they refer."13 
This is quite true: the non­distinction between signifier and signified is 
typical of the oral situation. However, writing does not automatically bring 
about an awareness of the distinction, nor is this awareness restricted to 
writing. In the context of rhetoric, we are dealing with texts that are orally 
delivered though often literally composed. W h a t is decisive is the emer­
gence of a level of meta­textual communication, in which it is the words 
and the way of formulation that matter more than, or along with, but in 
any case distinct from the subject matter. 
Later, philology adopts the new notion and applies it to the object 
of its own profession, opposing textus and commentarius. Textus is what a 
commentarius refers to, and commentarius is the kind of discourse that has 
a textus as its object. Philological work transforms a chain of words into 
a textus in making it the object of its operations: text critique, establish­
ing a text, comparison of variants, commenting, translating, exegesis. As 
a rule, linguistic utterances as such are, at least originally, not meant as 
texts. A poem, for instance, aims at being the object of any kind of enjoy­
ment—pleasure, reflection, learning—but not of philological treatment. 
Philological treatment belongs to a level or horizon that is secondary and 
posterior to the primary horizon of communication and reception. Wi th in 
this primary horizon, the notion of "text" has no natural evidence what­
soever. Therefore, it is unknown in most ancient languages. It arises only 
in the context of rhetoric and philology, that is, of meta­textual reflection. 
"Text," in other words, is a notion that belongs to meta­language, not to 
object language. I t is a meta­textual term. 
In everyday language, "text" is mostly associated with writing. A lin­
guistic unit becomes a text when it is written down. In linguistic termi­
nology, however, the word "text" denotes the highest meaningful unit of 
language—in opposition to "paragraph," "sentence," "phrase," "syntagma," 
"word," and finally "morpheme," the smallest meaningful unit—indepen­
dently of whether or not this highest unit appears in oral or written form. 
T h e linguistic definition of "text" is the complete inversion of its tradi­
tional and everyday meaning. Whi le I asserted above that text has no 
natural existence on the primary level of communication, it is, in the view 
of modern linguistics, the only unit in which language naturally occurs in 
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communication, whereas all the other units are artificial subdivisions and 
analytical constructs. W e communicate in texts and not in phrases, words, 
syllables, and morphemes. This notion of text, however, is much too gen­
eral and indistinct to be useful to this chapter's argument. Texts may con­
sist in just one word such as "hello" or in lengthy recitations such as The 
Odyssey, but they are the only natural communicational unit. However, in 
the present context we are interested not only in communication but also 
and above all in memorization and transmission. For these purposes, the 
everyday concept of "text," with its connotations of literacy, seems much 
more pertinent. 
Konrad Ehlich, a scholar of Hebrew and of general linguistics, has 
formulated a linguistic concept of "text" that integrates some decisive 
semantic elements of the everyday concept.14 Ehlich defines "text" as a 
message that is repeated, remembered, recovered, and referred to. T h e 
primal form of "text," not in the etymological but in the pragmatic sense, 
is the message that is delivered. T h e common denominator between the 
literary work that is commented upon and the message that is delivered 
is the act of reproduction. It is not the original speaker who generates 
the text, but the repeater—the messenger and the commentator. T h e 
decisive text­generating factor is the separation of the message from the 
situation of immediate communication, in other words, the creation of 
an "extended situation" {zerdehnte Situation) in which speaker and hearer, 
encoder and decoder are no longer co­present within the spatial and tem­
poral limits of the human voice. In these cases, the original speech act 
has to be preserved beyond the limits of the original situation in order to 
be transported and repeated in a second situation. T h e messenger has to 
learn the message by heart in order to be able to deliver it at another time 
and another place to the addressee. 
In this case, we may rightly speak of the "text" of the message. T h e 
written form of the message is not what is decisive, but the acts of storage, 
transmission, and reproduction are. The immediate situation is replaced 
with the extended situation unfolding in at least two and, in the case of 
literature, virtually infinite concrete situations that may stretch in time 
as long as the text is preserved and the conditions for its readability and 
understandability are assured. This notion of text replaces the narrow 
and technical correlation of textus and commentarius with the much more 
general correlation of text and transmission. Texts are speech acts in the 
context of extended communication situations. This concept has the 
great advantage of overcoming the all­too­close association of texts with 
written language; it allows for the idea of oral texts, but at the same time 
it retains a central semantic element of the philological and rhetorical 
76 Orality, Literacy, and Memory 
tradition by connecting "text" with transmission and reproduction. Text 
is the unit of speech that, on the side of the speaker/encoder, is connected 
with a need for transmission beyond the boundaries of an immediate 
situation and, on the side of the receiver, with a need for retrieval and 
reactualization. 
Institutionalizing the "Extended Situation": Cultural 
Texts and Cultural Coherence 
"Cultural texts" are a sub-group of texts that are constantly taken up and 
reproduced by a whole society. The concept of "cultural texts" includes 
much more than just "texts" in the sense of a linguistic unit. It refers to 
every semantic unit that is encoded in symbolic forms such as images, 
gestures, dances, rites, festivals, customs, and even landscapes such as 
the Australian "song lines," the German Rhine valley, or the medieval 
pilgrimage routes to Santiago de Compostela, as long as they are to be 
understood as semantic and not just geographic units and as long as they 
are reproduced, that is, reenacted or reactualized in the life of the com­
munity.15 Clifford Geertz introduced the term "cultural text" decades ago 
with respect to the Balinese cock fight, and I use it in this wide sense. In 
what follows, however, I will concentrate on verbal cultural texts. Cul­
tural texts exert a binding energy on the community in a normative and 
a formative sense. Normative cultural texts codify the norms of behav­
ior and range from simple proverbs to educational literature and books 
on manners and finally up to canonical and semi­canonical texts such 
as the Torah and the Shulkhan Arukh in the Jewish tradition. Formative 
texts formulate the self­image of the group and range from tribal myths 
and sagas of origin to literary works by Homer and Virgil, Dante and 
Shakespeare, Milton and Goethe. By the transmission of cultural texts, 
a society or culture reproduces itself in its "cultural identity" through the 
generations. 
Extended situations do not occur naturally; they have to be cultur­
ally institutionalized. They cannot develop and persevere without insti­
tutional support and framing. This applies already to the institution of 
the messenger. It must be ensured that the messenger reaches his or her 
destination, that he or she is admitted to the addressee of the message, 
and that the addressee will recognize the messenger as representative of 
the sender: hashaluah kasholeah 'oto ("the messenger is like the one who 
sent him" as the Hebrew phrase goes).16 The institute of the messenger is 
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a kind of contract involving the sender, the transmitter, and the receiver 
of the message. The sender must trust the messenger that he or she will 
faithfully pass on the message, the messenger must totally identify with 
his or her role of transmitter and must stick to the wording and meaning 
of the message, and the receiver must treat the messenger as the represen­
tative of the sender. Every act of transmission and every kind of extended 
situation implies something of this contractual aspect. The fact that texts 
may be read over long temporal and cultural distances rests on institu­
tional frames of this kind. 
Time-Structure 
"Culture" may be understood as the cover term for the sum total of 
extended situations or, rather, the extended hyper­situation including 
all other situations in which cultural texts,are encoded, transmitted, and 
reenacted. To be sure, this is not meant as a definition of culture, but 
just as a way to highlight one specific aspect of culture. The extension of 
the situation of communication past the limits of direct interaction, as 
well as the creation of a hyper­situation extending over several millennia, 
is an achievement of memory; it is this temporal aspect of culture that 
highlights its memory function. Writing is just one form of transmission 
and reenactment, albeit a very decisive one. The use of writing in the 
transmission of cultural texts changes fundamentally the time­structure 
of cultural memory. All the other forms of institutionalizing an extended 
situation depend on time and place, on temporal recurrence and/or spatial 
translocation. You have to wait for a feast to return or a rite to be per­
formed, and you have to go to an image, a monument, a sacred place in 
order to reconnect with its meaning.17 To reconnect with the meaning of 
written cultural texts, you do not have to wait for the next performance, 
you just have to read them. 
The difference may be illustrated by a quotation from Flavius Jose­
phus, who opposed Jewish and Gentile forms of cultural participation: 
That high and sublime knowledge, which the Gentiles with dif­
ficulty attained unto, in the rare and temporary celebration of 
their Mysteries, was habitually taught to the Jews, at all times 
Where, in any place but in this, are the whole People, by the spe­
cial diligence of the Priests, to whom the care of public instruc­
tion is committed, accurately taught the principles of true piety? 
So that the body­politic seems, as it were, one great Assembly, 
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constantly kept together, for the celebration of some sacred Mys­
teries. For those things which the Gentiles keep up for a few days 
only, that is, during those solemnities they call "Mysteries" and 
"Initiations," we, with vast delight, and a plenitude of knowledge, 
which admits of no error, fully enjoy, and perpetually contem­ > 
plate through the whole course of our lives.18 
The Gentiles have to wait until the next celebration of their mysteries, 
but the Jews are in constant and continuous possession of their cultural 
texts, because they are "habitually taught" by "public instruction." Their 
"mysteries" are permanent. Their form of community or "body politic" 
coheres and reproduces itself not by way of ritual but by means of teach­
ing and learning. When Josephus speaks of "teaching," he does not just 
think of teaching how to write and read, but of interpretation, or exegesis. 
To ensure the continuous readability of written cultural texts over a long 
stretch of time, which inevitably brings about changes of language and 
historical reality, the meaning of the texts must be kept alive by constant 
adaptation to changing circumstances. Otherwise the texts' meaning gets 
lost within three or four generations of social memory. In a literate culture 
such as the Jewish society Josephus describes, continuous exegesis fulfills 
the function of institutionalizing the extended situation of cultural coher­
ence, which in the pagan world is fulfilled by ritual repetition. 
This case may be generalized. Cultural texts form the cement or 
connective backbone of a society that ensures its identity and coher­
ence through the sequence of generations. Leading the sphere of mate­
rial objects aside, we may say that the dominant principle of coherence 
can be institutionally realized either in ritualistic or "textualistic" form. 
Ritual coherence is the predominant principle of cultural reproduction, in 
which the cultural texts are performed in the ways that Josephus ascribes 
to the Gentiles: feasts and rites. Textual coherence prevails when the cul­
tural texts are reproduced by ways of teaching and learning, which do not 
require much ritualization and formalization. Textual coherence requires 
institutions of learning and interpretation. Oral societies need a memo­
rization technique of transmission and a ritual or ceremonial organiza­
tion of performance. Writing or notational systems of pre­writing such 
as knotted chords and pictography might play a subsidiary role for the 
specialists in helping them to remember long stories or lists in the right 
order. But memory remains always the main carrier of the central stock of 
cultural knowledge, and ritual performance remains the dominant form 
of reproducing the cultural texts. The more literate a society, the more 
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continuous, de-ritualized, and individual is the form of participation in 
cultural texts. T h e greatest change in such participation has been brought 
about by the printing press.19 
Text-Structure: 
Mouvance and Exegesis 
"Textual coherence" requires not only the use of writ ing but also a con­
tinuous long­term readability of the writ ten texts. T h e language of the 
texts must not deviate too much f rom the spoken language, and the 
textual world must correspond to the actual world people are living 
in. Josephus, speaking of the Jewish case, refers to the "care of public 
instruction" and "accurate teaching" as devices the Jews employed in 
order not to lose contact with the meaning of their texts. T h e Jewish 
case, however, is extreme in that the cultural texts were not only writ ten 
down but brought into the form of a canon, meaning that they must not 
be changed, neither in the stock of texts selected for canonization nor 
in the wording, the surface structure of the singular texts. If the texts 
themselves must not be changed, exegesis is the only solution to ensure 
textual coherence. 
Before the canonization of texts and the rise of exegesis, however, the 
texts themselves were changed, that is, reformulated, amplified or substi­
tuted by other texts. Their "surface structure" was sacrificed in order to 
save at least part of their meaning. This is why even written texts tend 
to exist over a longer stretch of time in many different versions. In order 
to remain understandable, they are constantly rewritten, enlarged, con­
tinued. T h e continuous growth of the book of Isaiah, first into Deutero­
then into Trito­Isaiah, is a typical case of how a cultural text changes in 
what the Assyriologist Leo Oppenheim called "the stream of tradition."20 
The epic of Gilgamesh developed in the course of its transmission and 
redaction from a cycle of sagas into the "twelve­tablet composition," as 
it appears in the Neoassyrian library of Assurbanipal at Niniveh. In a 
similar way, the Egyptian Book of the Dead developed from just a pool of 
unconnected spells out of which every individual funerary papyrus picked 
its own specific selection into a real book with a fixed selection of 167 
spells in a particular order. Wri t ten texts, in this stream of tradition, share 
to a certain degree a sort of oral text. T h e medievalist Paul Zumthor, 
in his Introduction a la poesie ovale, coined the term mouvance, by which 
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he understands the flexibility even of written texts to adapt to changing 
audiences.21 
This flexibility is categorically stopped and excluded by the process 
of canonization. A cultural text that becomes part of the canon shares the 
absolute fixation of its surface articulation with sacred texts. Sacred texts 
are not necessarily cultural texts; they can be magical spells only a few spe­
cialists know, whereas cultural texts are by definition the common prop­
erty of the community or at least representative elite. Sacralization and 
canonization are different phenomena. They share the common principle 
of fixed wording but stem from different motives. T h e notion of "canon­
ization" should be reserved for literate culture, concerning a specific form 
of the transmission of written texts, whereas sacralization occurs also in 
oral tradition. T h e borderline case of the Rgveda, which is an orally trans­
mitted canon of sacred texts, must be explained separately and should not 
blur this necessary distinction. Sacred texts are verbal enshrinements of 
the holy. In sacred texts, not a syllable may be changed in order to ensure 
the magical power of the words to "presentify" the divine. In this context, 
it is not understanding that matters but the correctness of pronunciation, 
the ritual purity of the speaker, and other requirements concerning proper 
circumstances of performance. This principle of inflexibility and absolute 
fixation applies to sacred texts independently of their oral or literate form 
of transmission. Sacred texts, therefore, are exempt from the pressure to 
adapt to the hermeneutical conditions of a changing world. 
In the process of canonization, the principle of sacred fixation is applied 
to cultural texts. They are treated like verbal temples that enshrine divine 
presence, but at the same time they require understanding and application 
in order to exert their formative and normative impulses and demands. 
T h e solution to this problem is exegesis. Exegesis, or hermeneutics, is the 
successor of mouvance. In the mouvance stage of literate transmission, the 
commentary is worked into the fabric of the text. This method has been 
shown by Michael Fishbane to be typical of the biblical texts in their for­
mative phase.22 They are full of glosses, pieces of commentary that later 
redactors have added to the received text. In Babylonia, the closure of the 
verbal surface structure of a text was applied not only to sacred but also 
to literary texts as early as the end of the second millennium BCE, when 
Mesopotamian scribes started inserting blessings and curses in their colo­
phons of literary texts in order to prevent not only material damage of the 
tablet but also willful alteration of the text: "Neither add nor subtract!"23 
Once the text is closed by canonization, the commentary must stay outside 
and accompany the written text by separate ways of transmission, which 
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are very often oral, as is still the case in a traditional Islamic madrasa or 
a Jewish yeshiva. Also in oral recitation, canonical texts are often set off 
from commentaries using a formalization of recitation typical of sacred 
texts. They are sung instead of spoken.24 The difference between singing 
and speaking is as important for the performance of cultural texts as the 
difference between orality and literacy for their transmission.25 
TheuCultic" and the "Classic" 
To sum up: the main function of cultural texts may be defined as a con­
nective principle working in both the social and the temporal dimensions, 
a kind of normative and formative cultural program that conveys and 
reproduces cultural identity from one generation to the next. This consti­
tutes what may be called their "identity function."The original and tradi­
tional locus of cultural texts is memory (for storage and transmission) and 
ritual (for reproduction). Rituals provide the context for the ceremonial 
recitation, circulation, and communication of cultural texts. Although the 
evolution of literate culture and the invention of the printing press have 
led to a general accessibility of cultural texts, some traces of this original 
ritual framing are still preserved even in modern culture. In Germany you 
have to wait until Christmas for a public performance of the Christmas 
Oratorio and until Good Friday to listen to the St. Matthew Passion and 
St. John Passion by Johann Sebastian Bach; these rank among the cultural 
texts. This condition might be due to their religious meaning, but the 
same applies also to secular texts. Die Fledermaus, by Johann Strauss, is 
linked to New Year's Eve and Parsifal, by Richard Wagner, to Good Fri­
day. But these are exceptional cases. Normally, our modern culture is char­
acterized by the principle of ubiquitous and simultaneous accessibility of 
everything. Nevertheless, DVDs have not supplanted movies and plays, 
and CDs have not suppressed concerts. On the contrary, the concept of 
"live performance" has acquired a new importance in the age of technical 
reproduction and general accessibility. A performance receives its special 
status as "live performance" only through the existence of technological 
recordings, in much the same way as a linguistic unit receives its status as 
a text through the existence of its commentary or an "original" through 
the existence of copies. 
Cultural texts partake of the cultic and the classic. With this I would 
like to come back to the point from which I started: the need for trans­
mission and the will to form, both answering the specifically human 
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condition of being in time, of existing in a temporal horizon extending 
the life span of an individual. In their cultic aspect, cultural texts (and I 
am again referring to "texts" in the broad sense of the term, including pic­
tures, rites, dances, films) aim at participation, at shaping a community of 
participants; in their classic aspect cultural texts realize the will to form in 
an outstanding way and aim at imitation, variation, quotation, recycling. 
The cultic is related to the social dimension, the classic to the temporal 
dimension. A classic is an artifact that survives the changes of fashions, 
remaining a model of beauty and perfection because of its unsurpassable 
formal and symbolic pregnancy,26 whereas the cultic binds a community 
of believers or simply lovers (and sometimes only a short­lived generation 
of fans, buffs, aficionados) under its spell because of the religious or other­
wise compelling magnetism of its theme. In cultural texts, both principles 
combine, but in different proportions. Culture comprises much more 
than cultural texts, and however one defines the problematic concept of 
"culture," I am not arguing for its reduction to memory. By focusing on a 
section both of culture and of memory at which these notions intersect, 
we can see how cultural texts fulfill the memory function of culture, which 
is certainly not its only function but the one without which culture as a 
whole would not work. 
